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Abstract 
The study investigates the effect of fiscal and monetary policies on domestic debt dynamics 
and provides fiscal rules useful to control domestic debt dynamics and maintain fiscal 
consolidation. Using a New-Keynesian model with the fiscal sector, this study analyses the 
contribution of government spending on aggregate demand measured by fiscal multipliers 
and the impact of tax adjustment on domestic debt dynamics. The findings indicate that 
while consumption and capital income tax have a stabilizing effect on domestic debt, labor 
income tax produces a weakly positive impact on domestic debt growth due to a higher 
fraction of Non-Ricardian households in the economy. The study provides a quantitative 
framework through a Bayesian estimation of steady-state tax rates as a benchmark to tax 
policy, aiming at mitigating fiscal distress without an adverse impact on output growth. 
Keywords: New-Keynesian model, Fiscal multipliers effect, Non-Ricardian household, 
Fiscal and monetary policy, Bayesian estimation. 
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I. Introduction 
The recent trend in the dynamic of public debt in the Gambia reveals a high debt-to-GDP 
ratio resulting from the expansionary fiscal policy. Fiscal authorities have increased the level 
of external debt (through borrowing on concessional terms in the international market) and 
domestic debt as a consequence of the ambition to scale up investment and promote 
economic growth. As a result, the ratio of domestic debt to GDP has increased in recent 
years. In particular, the Treasury bill accumulation has increased over the years. The 
expansion in government expenditure combined with the inadequate tax policy has 
contributed to the high budget deficit over the years and thus excessive government 
borrowing. Against this backdrop, the private sector faces a challenge of credit constraint 
and borrows at a higher cost because of the high T-bill rate offered by fiscal authorities. 
Besides, when monetary authorities adjust interest rates upward to control inflation, the 
private sector is constrained in the financial market as it faces a high-interest rate. 
The main challenge faced by the government is how to coordinate fiscal policy with the 
monetary policy to curb down the dynamic of domestic debt and reduce its burden without 
undermining the efficiency of monetary policy. The challenge faced by monetary authorities 
in implementing effective monetary policy is that the lower interest rate provides more room 
for increasing public borrowing while crowding out private investment. For example, in the 
inflation-targeting monetary policy framework, the interest rate plays a crucial role in 
controlling inflation. Under inflation pressure, monetary authorities adjust the interest rate to 
control the money supply and reduce inflation. In this context, fiscal authorities face high 
borrowing costs as it was the case between 2002 and 2004 when the Treasury bill rate has 
skyrocketed to 27% on average, reaching a peak of 31% in 2003 while inflation has peaked 
up at an average of 13.3%. This fact is likely to cause financial stress in the case of 
government default, as 60% of domestic debt represents almost 50% of the short term assets 
in balance sheet of commercial banks. Also, the increasing interest payment on domestic 
debt (39% increase on average of interest payment on domestic debt from 2014 to 2017) 
constrains fiscal authorities from increasing capital spending to meet the Sustainable 
Development Goals as an essential proportion of government revenue goes to interest 
payment. Therefore, an increase in government spending implies new debt issuance to 
finance the deficit if the tax policy does not adjust subsequently.  
The study seeks to analyze the main driving force of the dynamic of domestic debt in other 
to provide tax policy rules useful to fiscal authorities. The paper incorporates the fiscal 
3 
 
sector in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to account for domestic 
debt as a fiscal instrument and examine the extent to which the Government could 
coordinate fiscal and monetary policies to alleviate fiscal distress. Its purpose is to help 
answer the following questions: How can authorities coordinate fiscal and monetary 
policies to control domestic debt dynamics and maintain fiscal consolidation? To what 
extent tax adjustment restricts government borrowing by providing more revenue without an 
adverse effect on aggregate demand? To answer these questions, we incorporate three 
different taxes in our model and two categories of government spending to explain the 
contribution of effective tax policy to sound fiscal stance and the effect of government 
spending on aggregate demand. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
relevant literature on the DSGE model with the fiscal sector. Section 3 deals with the 
background information on the Gambian domestic debt and the model specification, section 
4 provides the equilibrium solution of the model, and section 5 addresses the issue of 
calibration, estimation and policy implications. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
II. Literature review  
Since Lucas’ critique (1976), macroeconomic models have gone through new developments 
with the introduction of a dynamic approach to account for agents’ optimization or 
expectation formation. This approach considers parameters of the model in their reduced 
form rather than the structural form where they remain invariant. This class of models has a 
common characteristic based on the preferences of economic agents and shocks 
(technological shocks, for instance) through the intertemporal maximization of consumers’ 
utility functions (subject to budget constraint) and the production function. There are several 
presentations based on the neoclassical growth theory initially developed by King, Plosser, 
and Rabelo (1988) as well as other applications of these models to the analysis of monetary 
policy that was initially developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). For fiscal 
policy, a bunch of studies leveraged on DSGE models to analyze government fiscal policy 
(Cemi (2012), Smets and Wouters (2005), Yang and Traum (2011). 
In recent years, the debt situation has become increasingly critical for both developed and 
developing countries. However, debt sustainability analysis tools developed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to guide policymakers in their debt 
policies, particularly developing countries, only focus on partial equilibrium analysis of debt 
sustainability without any interconnectedness between different sectors and different agents 
4 
 
in the economy. Therefore, recent studies focus on general equilibrium analysis of 
government debt to examine the extent to which government debt crowds out private 
investment (Yang and Traum 2011). Under different monetary policy regimes in 
coordination with fiscal policy, it is convenient to estimate time-varying parameters to 
account for monetary and fiscal policy switching between active and passive regime (Davig 
and Leeper, 2009). Using a New Keynesian model, they stipulated that government 
spending generates positive impact on consumption in some policy regimes. 
Government spending effect on output is also explored using the DSGE model on US data to 
evaluate fiscal multiplier under different monetary regimes (Leeper et al. 2017). Recent 
empirical work in the context of Low-Income Countries (LIC) uses a New-Keynesian model 
to show analytically and through simulations how different sources of fiscal deficit 
financing play a key role in determining the effects of fiscal policy and related multipliers 
(Shen et al., 2015). This study is concerned with monetary and fiscal policy coordination 
under domestic debt stress, where the high-interest rate is likely to increase the debt burden 
and thus requires a discretionary fiscal policy to be implemented to alleviate government 
borrowing.  
III. The Gambia domestic debt and model specification 
This section presents the stylized fact about the domestic debt in the Gambia. It sets out the 
structural form of the New-Keynesian model that will serve to explain the dynamics of the 
domestic debt and its implication on the economy. 
A closer look at data on public debt suggests that domestic debt-to-GDP ratio has increased 
significantly from 2010, while the external debt-to-GDP ratio has decreased. As a 
consequence, the interest on domestic debt as a ratio of total revenue has increased, reaching 
22.5% on average. In contrast, the interest on external debt as a ratio of total revenue has 
reached 7.1% on average. As for the growth rate of both components of public debt, we can 
see that the domestic debt has increased over the period 2000-2017 at an average rate of 
18.3% as opposed to external debt which has increased at an average rate of 4.3%; 
suggesting the prominence of domestic borrowing (figure 1). The growth rate of interest 
payment on domestic debt was moderate from 2000 to 2014, with a peak in 2015 similar to 
that on external debt with a peak in 2014. 
However, before 2002, the expansionary fiscal policy was moderate before the situation 
deteriorated significantly during the period 2002-2004, leading to macroeconomic 
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imbalances (exchange rate depreciation, fiscal stress, and rising inflation to some extent). 
Thanks to a prudent monetary policy and sustained fiscal policy, the government had slowed 
down the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio from 2005 until the second half of 2010 before the 
situation worsened again with increasing borrowing. 
Figure 1: Stylized facts on the public debt (interest and stock) 
 
To better analyze the fiscal and monetary policy coordination, we consider a New-
Keynesian model with price stickiness and monopolistic competition. Following Yang and 
Traum (2011), we adopt different fiscal instruments and shocks to allow for adjustment of 
fiscal policy to the economic situation. As for different agents in the economy, the paper 
draws on Yang and Traum (2011), Stähler and Thomas (2011) to specify the model. 
Following Smets and Wouters (2007), Yang and Traum (2011), we include a set of 
structural shocks such as productivity shock, three tax shocks (shock on consumption tax, 
capital tax, and tax on labor as the main components of tax revenues). Finally, we consider 
two shocks to occur on government spending: shock on current spending and shock on 
capital spending (as a way to increase investment and economic growth). Overall, the model 
accounts for seven (07) shocks.  
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Model set up 
The model encompasses four agents in the economy: households, firms, the central bank, 
and fiscal sector. We consider a basic New-Keynesian model with price stickiness and wage 
rigidity in the sense that workers have no power in the labor market to set the wage. They 
face labor demand by firms, and the wholesale firms' maximization problem yields the 
equilibrium wage rate. Only prices are adjusted optimally in a monopolistic competition 
setting. The assumption that households cannot set the wage rate is supported by the feature 
of a small economy where workers have no power to sway the decision in the labor market. 
Therefore the optimal wage rate is derived from firms’ profit maximization and considered 
as given.  
Households’ problem:  
There are two categories of households known as savers and non-savers in the economy. 
The savers (also known as Ricardian households) represent a fraction ω  of the households 
in the economy. They have access to financial market; save part of their income for future 
consumption. They lend capital to firms at a rental rate tR ; buy government bonds in a form 
of financial asset at a return rate tr . This type of household follows the life-cycle theory 
where consumers save for future consumption when push comes to shove. Conversely, non-
savers, a fraction ( )1 ω− , have no access to credit and cannot buy financial instruments such 
as government bonds for future yields. This type of household known as “Rule-of-thumb” 
consumers lives only on the income from labor. In the specification, both households have 
the same utility function ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
,
1 1
t t
t t t
C L
U C L
σ γ
σ γ
− +
= −
− +
where 0σ ≻ is the risk aversion 
parameter and 1γ ≻  is the substitution parameter between labor and leisure. The households 
pay tax on consumption, labor income, and capital income (only savers pay capital income 
tax). We assume that government’s transfer to households is a form of government 
investment in social services and does not appear in the consumer budget constraint. 
As such, the utility maximization problem for these two categories of agents is as follows: 
Savers’ problem: They maximize the utility function ( ),s st t tU C L  subject to budget 
constraint 
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( ) ( ) ( )1 11 1 1c s P k P w st t t t t t t t t t t t tPC I B R K W L r Bτ τ τ+ −+ + + = − + − + 1 
( )1 c st t tPCτ+ is after-tax consumption spending in the period t , 
P
tI  is the households spending on durable goods in period t  
1+tB  Stands for bonds purchased by households in period t  and carried over to period 1+t , 
( )1 k Pt t tR Kτ−  is the income from capital saved in the previous period, 
( )1 w st t tW Lτ−  represents the labor income in the household budget and  
1t tr B− is the interest payment on bonds purchased in the previous period with maturity in the 
period t . 
The law of motion of private capital for this set of households is defined as follows:
( )1 1P P Pt t P tK I Kδ+ = + −  where Pδ is the depreciation rate of the stock of private capital. The 
budget constraint boils down to : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 1 1 1C s P K P L st t t t t t t P t t t t t tPC K B R K W L r Bτ τ δ τ+ + − + + + = − + − + − +   
The solution to the households’ problem provides the following equations: 
( )( )
( )
1
1
L s
t t t
t C
t t
C W
L
P
σ
γ τ
τ
−
−
=
+
         (1) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
s C
t t tK
P t t t t C s
t t
C
E R E
C
σ
σ
τ piβ δ τ
τ
−
+ +
+ +
−
+
 +
  
− + − =   + 
    (2) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
1
1 1
s P
t t
t tC C
t t t
C C
E r
σ σ
βτ pi τ
− −
+
+ +
 
  =
 + +
 
       (3) 
Non-Savers problem: Non-savers maximize the utility function ( ),ns nst t tU C L  subject to 
budget constraint: 
( ) ( )1 1c ns w nst t t t t tPC W Lτ τ+ = −         (4) 
                                                          
1
 The upper scripts s and ns on variable C stand for saver and non-saver. 
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The first-order condition with respect to consumption gives ( ) ( )1ns Ct t t tC Pσ λ τ− = +  or 
( )
( )1
ns
tns
t C
t t
C
P
σ
λ
τ
−
=
+
 where nstλ  is the Lagrangian multiplier for non-savers 
The aggregate labor in the economy is ( )1 ns st t tL L Lω ω= − + withω  the fraction of savers in 
the economy. Similarly, the aggregate consumption of households equals 
( )1 ns st t tC C Cω ω= − +  
Firms’ problem:  
There are two categories of firms producing two categories of goods: intermediate goods 
produced by wholesale firms and sold to retail firms. The final aggregate product of retail 
firms has a functional form known as Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator represented by 
1 11
,0t j t
Y Y
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ
−
− 
=   
 
∫ where ,j tY  for [ ]0,1j ∈ is the wholesale good j and ψ is the elasticity of 
substitution between wholesale goods. The general price of retail goods is tP . 
As commonly set in the New-Keynesian model, the representative retail firm maximizes its 
profit subject to
,j tY  by considering its price ,j tP as given.  
( )
, ,
1 11 1 1
, , , , ,0 0 0max max
j t j t
t t j t j t j t j t j t j t j
Y Y
t
PY P Y d P Y P Y d
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ
−
−
 
  
− = −   
  
 
∫ ∫ ∫ . 
The first-order condition of this problem yields 
,
,
t
j t t
j t
PY Y
P
ψ
 
=   
 
and
1
1 11
,0t j t j
P P d ψψ −− =
  ∫
1
. 
To a way consistent with Weitzman (1970), Barro (1990) and, more recently, Yang and 
Traum (2011), Stähler and Thomas (2011), the production of intermediate goods by 
wholesale firms follows Cobb Douglas technology with a slight modification to include 
public capital as input to the production. This feature is essential to the setting of a DSGE 
model for a small economy because the public sector is vital in the formation of output. 
Most of the private sector activities depend on the performance of the public sector, which is 
the availability of public infrastructure (roads, energy, etc.) necessary for private sector 
activities. The function is specified as follows:  
                                                          
1
 See Costa J. C. Jose. “Understanding DSGE models: Theory and Applications” for mathematical details. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3, , ,P G P Gt t t t t t t t tF K K L Z Y Z K K Lθ θ θ= =  Where tZ is the productivity factor 
reflecting the growth of technology. It follows an AR (1) process specified as
( ) ( )1log logt t tZ Zρ ε−= +  and ( )0,t zNε σ∼ . In line with Weitzman (1970), Yang and 
Traum (2011), Stähler and Thomas (2011), we assume constant return to scale in labor and 
private capital ( 1 3 1θ θ+ = ) because private and public capital are specific to the role for 
which they have been created and cannot be shifted (Weitzman 1970). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the private sector can shift factors by substituting labor for capital 
according to the return of each factor. The law of motion of public capital is set as follows: 
( ) 11G G Gt t G tK I Kδ −= + −   
These firms first minimize the cost of producing given the factor capital and labor cost and 
return on capital then maximize their profit by setting the price optimally. So the first 
problem consists of minimizing the cost subject to the output 
Thus the problem is set as follows : 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3
,
/min
P
t t
P P G
t t t t t t t t t
K L
W L R K s t Y Z K K L
θ θ θ
− =   
The solution to the Lagrangian problem provides the following equations:  
So 3 3t tt t t
t t
Y YL MC
W W
µ θ θ= =          (5) 
and 1 1
P t t
t t t
t t
Y YK MC
R R
θ µ θ= =         (6) 
1
1
P
P t t t
t t t
t t
Y R KK MC MC
R Y
θ
θ
= ⇒ =  
Note that the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to tY  is equal to tµ . Hence the 
marginal cost t tMCµ = .after simplification equals  
( )
3 1
2
3 1
1 t t
t G
t t
W RMC
Z K
θ θ
θ θ θ
   
=    
  
1
        (7) 
                                                          
1
 See Costa Junior, Celso Jose. “Understanding DSGE models: Theory and Applications” for details on algebra 
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The second step consists of setting the optimal price by maximizing the profit. We assume a 
certain degree of price stickiness in the model since only a fraction α of wholesale firms can 
set the price optimally at 
,j tP
∗ and ( )1 α−  keep their price unchanged at
, 1j tP − .  
Subsequently, the resulting profit maximization problem boils down to: 
( ) ( )
,
, , ,
0
max
j t
i
t j t j t i j t i
iP
E P Y CTβα
∗
∞
∗
+ +
=
−∑  
( )
,
, , , ,
0 , ,
max
j t
i t i t i
t j t j t i j t i j t i
iP j t j t
P PE P Y Y MC
P P
ψ ψ
βα
∗
∞
∗ + +
+ + +∗ ∗
=
    
 
−           
∑  
The first-order condition implies that:  
( ) ( ) ,
, ,
0 ,
1 0i j t it j t i j t i
i j t
Y
E Y MC
P
αβ ψ ψ∞ ++ +∗
=
 
− + =  
 
∑ . The solution to the problem yields:
( ) ( ), ,01
i
j t t j t i
i
P E MCψ αβ
ψ
∞
∗
+
=
=
−
∑ .  
As in the new Keynesian specification, we assume that all firms resetting their price have 
the same marginal cost as follows: 
( )
3 1
2,
3 1
1 t t
j t i t G
t t
W RMC MC
Z K
θ θ
θ θ θ+
   
= =    
  
. 
The aggregate price level boils down to ( ) ( )
1
1 11
11t t tP P P
ψ ψψα α
−
−
− ∗
−
 
= − +  
1
. This expression 
implies that when all firms reset their prices at tP
∗
 ( 1α = ), the aggregate price level t tP P
∗
= . 
Therefore, the new price level depends on the fraction of firms with the ability to reset the 
price in the economy. 
Fiscal policy 
Government levies taxes on three different goods at different rates: tax on capital income (
τ kt ), labor income tax (τ wt ), and tax on consumption (τ ct ). Following Stähler and Thomas 
(2011), we assume that public spending has two components, which are public investment 
spending and public consumption spending. The latter is the sum of current expenditure 
(purchase of goods and services by the public sector), interest payment, and payroll. 
                                                          
1
: See Costa Junior, Celso Jose. “Understanding DSGE models: Theory and Applications” for details on 
algebra. 
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Government budget constraint implies that the sum of revenue from different taxes and the 
bonds issued in each period equals the expenditure (current expenditure, capital expenditure 
and interest payment on domestic debt stock). In each period t , government domestic debt 
stock accumulation emerges from the primary deficit, which is the gap between government 
revenue and its total expenditure. The primary deficit financing implies the issuance of new 
debt 1td +  with maturity in the period 1t + . Thus the government budget constraint is 
equivalent to: 
1 1
C K P L c i
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tPC R K W L d PG PG r dτ τ τ + −+ + + = + +     (8) 
Following Yang and Traum (2011), we assume that tax rates are endogenous variables 
which depend on a lag (an AR(1) term as feedback effects), the output gap and debt-to-GDP 
ratio to reflect the response of tax rates to domestic debt-to-GDP ratio1. This specification 
illustrates the adjustment of tax rates by fiscal authorities following an explosive debt. The 
specification of the tax rates is as follows2: 
( )( )1 11c c ct c t c c t c t tY Sτ ρ τ ρ ϕ κ ε− −= + − + +ɶɶɶ ɶ        (9) 
( )( )1 11w w wt w t w w t w t tY Sτ ρ τ ρ ϕ κ ε− −= + − + +ɶɶɶ ɶ        (10) 
( )( )1 11k k kt k t k k t k t tY Sτ ρ τ ρ ϕ κ ε− −= + − + +ɶɶɶ ɶ       (11) 
1
1
1
t
t
t
dS
y
−
−
−
=            (12) 
Where ts  is the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio. 
On the government spending side, both expenditures (capital and consumption expenditures) 
react to the debt-to-GDP ratio. Following Traum and Yang, we set these fiscal rules as 
follows:  
( )1 1c c gct gc t gc gc t tG G Sρ ρ ϕ ε−= + − +ɶ ɶ ɶ        (13) 
( )1 1i i gi Gt gi t gi gi t t tG G S Iρ ρ ϕ ε−= + − + =ɶ ɶ ɶ        (13) 
The shock components are exogenous shocks reflecting the innovations in government fiscal 
policy and are causes of the explosiveness of domestic debt. They are represented here by 
                                                          
1
 The term of output gap reflects the macroeconomic conditions on the tax rate. We assume that in period of 
boom, fiscal authorities increase tax rate and in recession, they reduce tax rate. 
2
 Variable with tilde represents the deviation from the steady-state value. 
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the random term iid process ( )0, εε σ∼ jjt N . The introduction of contemporaneous term of 
debt-to-GDP ratio implies that any innovation in government fiscal policy has a direct 
impact on the domestic debt. 
Monetary policy rule  
The monetary policy of the central bank has two objectives: the inflation targeting and the 
reserve requirement. Thus, in the conduct of monetary policy, the central bank has two main 
instruments amid others, which are the interest rate and open market. The central bank 
applies the Taylor rule gradually adjusting the interest rate in response to the inflation target 
and the economic growth target. The monetary policy interest rate is  as follows: 
( )( )1 1 rt r t r t y t tr r Ypiρ ρ ϕ pi ϕ ε−= + − + +ɶɶ        (14) 
where ( )0, rrt N εε σ∼  and
1
t
t
t
P
P
pi
−
= . 
The random term in the equation illustrates monetary policy shock enabling monetary 
authorities to adjust interest rates to meet the inflation target and output growth. The 
parameter
r
ρ  is the smoothing parameter of interest rates reflecting the feed-back effect. The 
parameters piφ and yφ represent the response of inflation and output gap when monetary 
authorities adjust interest rates to achieve inflation target or output growth. These parameters 
reflect the importance that the central bank attaches to inflation targeting and economic 
growth.  
Markets clearing condition in the economy: 
The labor market clearing implies that labor supply by households equals labor demand by 
firms t tN L= . Furthermore, capital market clearing implies that government borrowing 
equals household bonds. The government budget constraint equals: 
1 1
C P K P L c i
t t t t t t t t t t t t tC R K W L d G G r dτ τ τ − −+ + + = + + .      (15) 
Introducing the bonds market-clearing condition =t td B and adding household budget and 
simplifying we get the aggregate resource constraint: 
c i P
t t t t tY G G C I= + + +          (16) 
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IV. The dynamic equilibrium of the economy 
4.1  Equilibrium equations 
The equilibrium conditions provide the expressions of consumption, labor supply, capital, 
and bonds held by households{ }1 1, , ,t t t tC L K B+ + . 
The equilibrium equations are summarized as follows:  
Savers equilibrium equations 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
w
t ts s
t t C
t t
W
C L
P
σ γ τ
τ
−
=
+
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
s C
t t tK
P t t t t C s
t t
C
E R E
C
σ
σ
τ piβ δ τ
τ
−
+ +
+ +
−
+
 +
  
− + − =   + 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
11
1
s C
t t
t t tCs
tt
C
r E
C
σ
σ
τ
piβ τ
−
+
+
−
+
 +
 =
 +
 
 
Non-savers equilibrium equations 
( ) ( )1 1c ns L nst t t t t tPC W Lτ τ+ = −  
( ) ( )1ns Ct t t tC Pσ λ τ− = +  
Aggregate labor and consumption equations 
( )1 ns st t tL L Lω ω= − +  and ( )1 ns st t tC C Cω ω= − +  
Labor and capital equation (firms’ equations) 
3
t
t t
t
YL MC
W
θ=  and 1P tt t
t
YK MC
R
θ=  
( )
3 1
2
3 1
1 t t
t G
t t
W RMC
Z K
θ θ
θ θ θ
   
=    
  
 
( ) ( )
1
1 11
11t t tP P P
ψ ψψα α
−
−
− ∗
−
 
= − +  
 
( ) ( ), ,01
i
j t t j t i
i
P E MCψ αβ
ψ
∞
∗
+
=
=
−
∑  
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Aggregate resource constraint 
P c i
t t t t tC I G G Y+ + + =   
 
4.2  Steady-state 
In steady-state, all variables in equilibrium equations are constant, and we drop the subscript 
t and solve for steady-state values. 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
w
ss sss s
ss ss C
ss ss
W
C L
P
σ γ τ
τ
−
=
+
 
( ) ( )( ) 11 1 KP ss ssRδ τ β− + − = ,    1ss ssr piβ=  
( ) ( )1 1c ns w nsss ss ss ss ss ssP C W Lτ τ+ = −  and ( ) ( )1ns Css ss ss ssC Pσ λ τ− = +  
Aggregate labor and consumption equations 
( )1 ns sss ss ssL L Lω ω= − +  and ( )1 ns sss ss ssC C Cω ω= − +  
Labor and capital equation (firms’ equations) 
3
ss
ss ss
ss
YL MC
W
θ= , 1P ssss ss
ss
YK MC
R
θ= , ( )
3 1
2
3 1
1 ss ss
ss G
ss ss
W RMC
Z K
θ θ
θ θ θ
   
=    
  
 
( ) ( )
1
1 111ss ss ssP P P
ψ ψψα α
−
−
− ∗ 
= − +  
, ( ) ( )
1
1 1ss ss
P MCψ
ψ αβ
∗
=
− −
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3P Gss ss ss ss ssY Z K K Lθ θ θ=  and G GG ss ssK Iδ = , P PP ss ssK Iδ =  
C K P L c i
ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ssP C R K W L d P G P G r dτ τ τ+ + + = + +  
ss
ss ss ss ss
ss
dS d S Y
Y
= ⇒ =  and the aggregate resource constraint yields : P c iss ss ss ss ssC I G G Y+ + + =  
To solve the steady-state equations, we made some assumptions on the steady-state values: 
ns s
ss ss ssL L L= = , 
ns s
ss ss ssC C C= = 1ss ss ssZ P pi= = = and. Solving these equations recursively, we 
get the steady-state value for the remaining endogenous variables.  
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4.3  Linearized form model 
To log linearize, we use the following properties (Uhlig 1999) as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )log log exp tXt t ss t ss t ssX X X X X X X e= − ⇒ = = ɶɶ ɶ  and 1tX te X≈ +ɶ ɶ  in the neighborhood 
of 0tX =ɶ , 1t t
X aY
t te X aY
+
≈ + +
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ with 0t tX Y ≈ɶ ɶ 1 1t
X
t t tae a a X+ +   Ε ≈ + Ε   
ɶ
ɶ , 
Each variable tX is replaced by t
X
ssX e
ɶ
. The transformation provides the following linear 
equations.  
The log-linearized form of Ricardian optimal solution equations are as follows:  
s s C w
t t t t t tC L T P T Wσ γ+ + + = +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
where 
1
w w
w ss t
t w
ss
T τ τ
τ
−
=
−
ɶ
ɶ , 
1
C C
C ss t
t C
ss
T τ τ
τ
=
+
ɶ
ɶ  and 
1
K K
K ss t
t K
ss
T τ τ
τ
= −
−
ɶ
ɶ  
By the same way, 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1
s s
t tK
t P t t t t tC C
t t
C C
E E R E
σ σ
β δ τ pi
τ τ
− −
+
+ + +
+
  
    
− + − =   + +   
 turns to  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 11s s C C k kt t t t t t ss ss t t tC C E T T T R E R Tσ piβ β+ + + + +− + − + = +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶɶ  
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
11
1
s C
t t
t t tCs
tt
C
r E
C
σ
σ
τ
piβ τ
−
+
+
−
+
 +
 =
 +
 
becomes ( ) ( )1 1 11s s C Ct t t t t t tC C E T T rσ piβ β+ + +− + + − =ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶɶ ɶ   
Non-savers 
( ) ( )1 1c ns w nst t t t t tPC W Lτ τ+ = −  is equivalent to C ns w nst t t t t tT C P T W L+ + = + +ɶɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
( ) ( )1ns Ct t t tC Pσ λ τ− = +  is equivalent to ns Ct t t tC T Pσ λ− = + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
Aggregate labor and consumption equations 
( )1 ns st t tL L Lω ω= − +  equivalent to ( )1 ns st t tL L Lω ω= − +ɶ ɶ ɶ  
( )1 ns st t tC C Cω ω= − +  equivalent to ( )1 ns st t tC C Cω ω= − +ɶ ɶ ɶ   
Labor and capital equation (firms’ equations) 
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3
t
t t
t
YL MC
W
θ=  equivalent to t t t tL mc Y W= + −ɶ ɶ ɶ  where t t ssmc MC MC= −  
1
P t
t t
t
YK MC
R
θ=  equivalent to Pt t t tK mc Y R= + −ɶ ɶ ɶ  
( )
3 1
2
3 1
1 t t
t G
t t
W RMC
Z K
θ θ
θ θ θ
   
=    
  
 equivalent to 3 1 2
G
t t t t tmc W R Z Kθ θ θ= + − −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
Some algebra on price equations for tP and tP
∗ provides the New-Keynesian Philips equation 
for inflation. 
( )( ) ( )1 1 1t t t t tE mc Pα αβpi β pi α+
− − 
= + − 
 
ɶɶ ɶ  
1 !t t tP Ppi + += −ɶ ɶɶ  
Production sector 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3P Gt t t t tY Z K K Lθ θ θ=  equals 1 2 3P Gt t t t tY Z K K Lθ θ θ= + + +ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
( ) ( )1log logt t tZ Zρ ε−= + equals 1t t tZ Zρ ε−= +ɶ ɶ  
( )1 1G G Gt G t G tK I Kδ δ+ = + −ɶ ɶ ɶ   and ( )1 1P P Pt P t P tK I Kδ δ+ = + −ɶ ɶ .  
Government budget constraint boils down to:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
C C K P P K w w
ss ss ss t t t ss ss ss t t t ss ss ss t t t
c c i i
ss ss t t ss ss t t ss ss t t ss t
P C C P R K K R W L W L
P G G P P G P G r d r d d d
τ τ τ τ τ τ
− +
+ + + + + + + +
= + + + + + −
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶɶ ɶɶ ɶ ɶ
 
And the aggregate resource constraint turns to: 
P P c c i i
ss t ss t ss t ss t ss tC C I I G G G G Y Y+ + + =  
5 calibration and estimation 
5.1  Data and Calibration 
We combined different data sources to achieve the calibration as well as the estimation of 
the model parameters. First, the national sources, mainly government finance statistics, 
provide data on government consumption expenditure, capital expenditure, tax revenues, 
and stock of domestic debt. We also retrieve a series of Treasury bill rates from central bank 
statistics. These data span from 1999 to 2017 on an annual basis. The World Bank 
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Development Indicator database (WDI) provides data on real GDP, consumer price index 
inflation, household consumption, stock of capital (gross fixed capital formation and gross 
capital formation), and labor force participation.  
We refer to Cooley and Prescott (1995), Uribé and Schmitt-Grohé (2017), to perform the 
calibration. As described in Uribé and Schmitt-Grohé, we combined two ways to accomplish 
the calibration: econometric estimation and calibration based on parameters’ values 
matching moments of data that the model aims to explain. Following this approach, we 
calibrate the autocorrelation parameters with the regression method (OLS approach), such as 
persistence parameters ( ), , , , ,c w k gc gi rρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ and other parameters in the linear equations
( ), , , , , , , , ,c c w w k k gc gi ypiϕ κ ϕ κ ϕ κ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ 1.  
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), we calibrate the capital depreciation rate Pδ and Gδ . 
Starting from the law of motion of capital ( )1 1G G Gt t G tK I Kδ+ = + − , and using some algebra, 
we arrive at the following identity: ( )1 1
1
1
G G G
t t t t
G
t t t t
Y K I K
Y Y Y Y
δ+ +
+
= + −  Assuming that 1t
t
Y g
Y
+
=  equals 
gross GDP growth rate and arranging the expression, we get ( ) 1
1
1 /
G G
t t
G
t t
I Kg
Y Y
δ +
+
− + = . By 
using the average ratios in the expression over the period 1990-2017, it follows that 
0.035Gδ =  and 0.060Pδ = , implying that 6% of private capital depreciates each period 
while 3.5% of the public capital depreciates each period. For parameters in the production 
function, we set the share of private capital and labor to their conventional value according 
to the literature ( )1 0.34θ = and ( )3 0.66θ = . The parameter 2θ of the public capital is 
calibrated to the average ratio of gross fixed public capital formation (% of GDP). The 
persistence term of the total factor productivity is calibrated to 0.80ρ =  to avoid the 
explosive solution.  
For the set of parameters calibrated to match the moments of data (first and second 
moments), we use average ratios for data collected on key macroeconomic variables. The 
steady-state values or deterministic equilibrium relationships allow us to assign values to 
these parameters. For instance, the static equilibrium derived from the Euler equation 
                                                          
1
. Using the OLS approach, we get the confidence interval for these parameters in which we choose the 
convenient values to avoid indeterminacy or explosive solution. In cases where the OLS does not provide an 
accurate value for the parameter, the average ratio of the relevant variable over GDP is used instead of the OLS 
estimates. 
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implies that the discount factor equals the inverse of the gross interest rate 1
r
β = 
 
. 
Therefore, we calibrate the parameter β  to match the average T-bill rate r . The fraction of 
saversω  is calibrated to 0.20 (20% of households are savers), and the price stickiness 
parameter α is calibrated to 0.70 equivalents to average price duration of three quarters. The 
risk aversion parameterσ  is set to 1.5 according to the literature as well as the labor 
substitution parameterγ , and the degree of substitution between intermediate goods ψ
equals 2. For fiscal variables, we use the steady-state values equal to the mean value of each 
variable ratio to GDP. These are 0.192cssτ = , 0.019
w
ssτ = , 0.043
k
ssτ = and 0.37ssS = . Table 
(4) in the appendix provides the calibrated values of parameters in the model. 
5.2  Estimation 
We estimate the model using seven observable variables on an annual basis: real GDP ( )tY , 
household consumption ( )tC , government consumption ( )CtG , consumer price index 
inflation ( )tpi , revenue from consumption tax ( )Ctτ , revenue from the capital income tax ( )ktτ
, and T-bill rate ( )tr . The choice of these variables is motivated by the issue of identification 
of deep parameters in the model and the problem of singularity arising from the choice of 
linearly dependent observable variables1. Since the model is log-linearized around its 
steady-state, we applied the same transformation to observable variables (the first difference 
to the log of each variable), which is equivalent to the closed-form expression of the growth 
rate of each variable (figure 2 in appendix). 
We perform the estimation using the Bayesian approach, which requires the prior 
distribution as well as the support of the distribution of each parameter. As such, we refer to 
Herbst and Schorfheide (2016) to choose the prior distribution of the parameters to be 
estimated. In literature, the prior of the variances of exogenous shocks follows an inverse 
gamma distribution with support ( )0,∞ . The autoregressive parameters
( ), , , , , ,c w k gc gi rρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ , the discount factor ( )β , the Calvo price stickiness parameter ( )α , 
the capital depreciation rates ( ),G Pδ δ , the steady-state tax rates ( ), ,c k wss ss ssτ τ τ  and the 
production function parameters (capital and labor share 1 2 3, ,θ θ θ ) have prior distribution Beta 
                                                          
1
 See Iskrev (2010b) for details on the identification of parameters.  
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because  they are bounded on[ ]0,1 . The risk aversion and labor substitution parameters 
follow Gamma distribution. Finally, the parameters relating GDP and debt ratio to fiscal 
variables have normal distribution1. For parameters relating GDP and debt to fiscal variables 
such as consumption tax, capital income tax, and labor income tax, their priors are set to 
normal distribution because of ambiguity underlying the sign of these parameters. We then 
perform the identification test on the parameters and find that they are all identified except 
the fraction of savers ( )ω due to the choice of observables available for the estimation. 
Therefore it is not estimated. The outcome of the identification test indicates that 99.4% of 
the prior support gives a unique saddle-path solution to the model. The sensitivity analysis 
shows the importance of parameters on the model in its linear expectation representation and 
confirms the identifiability of the parameters (figure 14)2. We conclude that the model does 
not feature any identification problems inherent to the structure of the DSGE model. The 
estimation provides the results summarized in table 1. The posterior mean values, the 
variances as well as the Highest Probability Density Interval (HPDI) for each parameter are 
computed from 10,000 draws from the prior support using Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) 
algorithm3.  
The general picture emerging from the outcomes is that the prior distributions match the 
posterior accurately in most cases, suggesting that the information in the data used to 
estimate the parameter are consistent with our prior beliefs (figure 16). In addition, figure 15 
suggests that the calibrated values of the parameters provide non-explosive solutions to the 
model. It also suggests that Blanchard-Kahn conditions are satisfied because the estimated 
mode is at the maximum of the posterior likelihood for almost all the parameters4. 
The most exciting aspect of these estimates is the steady-state tax rates and the 90% HPDI 
derived from the posterior density. It stands out that contrary to the claim that the capital 
should not be taxed at steady-state (Chamley (1986), Chari et al. (1991) and others), our 
findings reveal a steady-state value of 0.0676 (6.76%) and a range of [ ]0.0430,  0.0962  
within which the fiscal authorities could set the capital income tax. This finding corroborates 
the view of Piketty (2015) who argues that capital should be taxed because its return is 
always higher than the economic growth throughout history and the gap between the return 
                                                          
1
 See Herbst and Schorfheide (2016) for details on Bayesian estimation of DSGE. The choice of prior is guided 
by the restriction on the domain of some parameters and the uncertainty about the sign 
2
 See Iskrev (2010b) and Ratto (2011) for details on the Identification test and sensitivity analysis. 
3
 See Herbst and Schorfheide (2016) for details on the methodology 
4
. The red dots in some graphs indicate that for parameter values in this range, the model cannot be solved due 
to violations of the Blanchard-Kahn conditions (indeterminacy or no bounded solution). 
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to capital and GDP growth is the leading cause of inequality1. Unquestionably, the steady-
state tax on capital income cannot be around zero in a developing economy even though the 
capital stock is essential to economic growth and job opportunities. As far as consumption 
tax is concerned, our estimates provide a reasonable rate compared to that applicable in 
similar economies where the value-added tax (VAT) is 18%. As for the labor income steady-
state tax rate, its value is close to the rate of capital income, and the lower value almost 
equal to the posterior mean of the capital income tax.  
Further analysis of the estimated parameters of the fiscal rules provides evidence that tax 
rates respond positively to explosive domestic debt-to-GDP ratio meaning that fiscal policy 
adjusts to any increase of debt-to GDP ratio during the previous period. Additionally, the tax 
rates respond positively to the economic situation as the coefficients of the output gap in the 
tax rate equations are positive in the three instrument equations. The positive values of the 
posterior mean, for the prior normal distribution, illustrate the stabilization role of tax 
instruments. However, the 90 % interval encompasses zero for the parameters of output gap 
and domestic debt in tax equations. This suggests that fiscal authorities at some time over 
the period of the estimation do not consider neither the output gap nor the deviation of 
domestic debt from its steady-state to adjust tax rate. This illustrates the time inconsistency 
of fiscal policy that could lead to higher than expected domestic debt level2.  
Turning to the government spending side, we observe that the estimates of debt-to-GDP 
coefficients have the expected sign. Although their prior distributions are normal, their 
lower bounds of the 90% HPDI are both positive. This finding supports the idea that 
government spending (both consumption and investment) is the main driving force of 
domestic debt dynamics.  
Equally important is the analysis of the estimated parameters in the Taylor rule, especially 
the inflation and output parameters, which reflect the importance of the output gap and 
inflation in monetary policy decision by central bank authorities. The prior means for these 
two parameters are set to their conventional calibrated values, giving more weight to 
inflation and a relatively smaller weight to output, bearing in mind the problem of 
indeterminacy. As provided by the estimate, both coefficients are very close to their prior 
                                                          
1
 Although our model is not meant to define the optimal taxation for this economy, zero tax on capital income 
is positively discriminatory to Ricardian households. 
2
 The 90% interval of the coefficient of domestic debt in the labor income tax equation does not encompasses 
zero. 
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mean values, suggesting that monetary authorities react timely to inflation in a way 
consistent with the monetary policy framework. 
An important finding which deserves comments is the production function parameters, 
especially private capital and labor inputs share. We observe that the estimated values of 
these two parameters imply a decreasing return to scale in these two factors. Looking closely 
at the 90% interval, we can infer that neither combination of the two parameters yields a 
constant or increasing return to scale in labor and private capital meaning that for any two 
values from the 90% HPDI of the parameters, the sum is always less than a unit. This feature 
is mainly due to the share of private capital, which is lower than the calibrated value. 
The estimation provides the magnitude of different shocks in the model as an illustration of 
the significance of innovations in the model. The results suggest that the shock to labor 
income tax was the most prominent during the period of estimation and contributes to the 
fluctuation in all fiscal variables (government spending, debt, and tax rates) as well as output 
growth, consumption, and inflation. The productivity shock is another sizeable shock with a 
significant contribution to the fluctuation in output growth. The government capital 
expenditure shocks have also been sizeable in magnitude. From the historical shock 
decomposition, it appears that the fluctuation in the domestic debt stems from the following 
shocks: shocks to government capital expenditure, interest rate, labor income tax, and 
productivity. The most important contribution to the positive movement of domestic debt 
(deviation above its steady-state) arises from positive disturbances in government capital 
spending while government consumption spending has no contribution to fluctuation during 
the period of estimation. 
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Table 1: Prior and Posterior Distributions  of the estimated parameters 
Parameters Prior distribution Prior mean Posterior 
mean 90% HPDI Post deviation 
σ  Gamma 1.5 1.5296 [1.3856,   1.6514] 0.1000 
γ  Gamma 1.5 1.6946 [1.5435,   1.8299] 0.1000 
β  Beta 0.88 0.8840 [0.8705,   0.8988] 0.0100 
1θ  Beta 0.330 0.1214 [0.0651,   0.1683] 0.0500 
2θ  Beta 0.070 0.0360 [0.0014,   0.0712] 0.0500 
3θ  Beta 0.660 0.6587 [0.6441,   0.6744] 0.0100 
ρ  Beta 0.800 0.8007 [0.7978,   0.8040] 0.0020 
Gδ  Beta 0.035 0.0293 [0.0194,   0.0401] 0.0100 
Pδ  Beta 0.060 0.0616 [0.0494,   0.0724] 0.0100 
cρ  Beta 0.900 0.8974 [0.8824,   0.9121] 0.0100 
cϕ  Normal  0.042 0.1053 [-0.1363,  0.3335] 0.1500 
cκ  Normal 0.037 0.0848 [-0.0285,  0.1910] 0.1000 
wρ  Beta 0.600 0.6003 [0.5989,   0.6016] 0.0010 
wϕ  Normal 0.097 0.1338 [-0.1132,  0.3915] 0.1500 
wκ  Normal 0.239 0.2149 [0.0709,   0.3672] 0.1000 
kρ  Beta 0.600 0.6003 [0.5993,   0.6017] 0.0010 
kϕ  Normal 0.140 0.1640 [-0.2623,  0.5676] 0.5000 
kκ  Normal 0.064 0.0934 [-0.0581,  0.2592] 0.1000 
gcρ  Beta 0.800 0.8008 [0.7632,   0.8300] 0.0200 
gcϕ  Normal 0.300 0.2023 [0.0918,   0.3134] 0.1000 
giρ  Beta 0.600 0.5882 [0.5625,   0.6156] 0.0200 
giϕ  Normal 0.30 0.2636 [0.0972,   0.4144] 0.1000 
r
ρ  Beta 0.590 0.6012 [0.5727,   0.6297] 0.0200 
piϕ  Gamma 1.500 1.4960 [1.4828,   1.5082] 0.0100 
yϕ  Gamma 0.500 0.5074 [0.4949,   0.5200] 0.0100 
ψ  Gamma 2.00 1.9950 [1.9806,   2.0089] 0.0100 
α  Beta 0.70 0.7009 [0.6994,   0.7024] 0.0010 
c
ssτ  
Beta 0.192 0.1882 [0.1774,   0.1973] 0.0100 
k
ssτ  
Beta 0.043 0.0676 [0.0430,   0.0962] 0.0100 
w
ssτ  
Beta 0.019 0.0771 [0.0642,   0.0899] 0.0100 
zσ  inv_gamma 0.001 3.2301 [2.6247,   3.7693] Inf 
tcσ  inv_gamma 0.044 0.1193 [0.0881,   0.1499] Inf 
tkσ  inv_gamma 0.031 0.1394 [0.1012,   0.1711] Inf 
twσ  inv_gamma 0.070 30.9523 [24.533,  35.691] Inf 
gcσ  inv_gamma 0.038 0.0753 [0.0537,   0.0944] Inf 
giσ  inv_gamma 0.164 1.7749 [0.9090,   2.6136] Inf 
r
σ  inv_gamma 0.010 0.0492 [0.0347,   0.0620] Inf 
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5.3  The impulse response of endogenous variables to shocks 
Based on the parameter values, the time paths of endogenous variables of the model are 
simulated following different shocks. We first consider the shocks on fiscal variables 
(government expenditure and distortionary tax rates) to assess the impact on fiscal variables 
and the domestic debt path. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the effects of fiscal shocks on 
the debt path and economic growth and the crowding-out effect on the private sector.  
Government spending shocks: The first part of the analysis examines the effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy on the dynamic of domestic debt. Figure 3 presents the model 
implied impulse response of key variables following a shock to government consumption 
spending. As can be seen from the figure, the dynamic of domestic debt has the expected 
impulse response to shock on government consumption spending. It appears that the 
increase of public consumption spending implies a high growth rate of domestic debt, 
contraction of public and private investments. What stands out here is that the increase of 
government consumption expenditure implies an increase of domestic debt which crowds 
out private investment meaning that any increase in government borrowing leads to a 
reduction of access to credit by private sector. The increase of government consumption 
spending also leads to the contraction of public investment growth rate. The two effects are 
further exemplified by the fact that government consumption shock is not followed by a 
convenient tax adjustment policy to provide more revenue. As the impulse response shows, 
we observe a little adjustment of different tax rates; yielding a gap between government 
revenue and expenditure thus higher domestic debt to finance budget deficit resulting from 
the increase in government consumption. Turning to the impact on real variables, it can be 
noted that expansionary government spending has a positive impact on output and 
households’ consumption as it appears on the impulse response figure 3 . This result was 
also reported by Galí et al (2007) in a New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb 
households. According to the literature, the reason for the positive effect of government 
spending shock on output and household consumption is the existence of an important 
fraction of non-Ricardian households; financially constrained and consume their income 
fully in each period as opposed to Ricardian households. Another factor adding to the 
positive response of household consumption to government spending shock is the price 
stickiness featured in the New-Keynesian model. The estimated value of the Calvo price 
stickiness parameter suggests an average price duration of three quarters. This provides 
evidence of a certain degree of price stickiness in the goods market as a necessary condition 
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to a positive response of consumption following a shock to government spending (Galí et al 
2007)1. 
In much the same way, a shock to government investment expenditure creates the same 
impact on fiscal variables but with different magnitudes as can be seen in figure 42. As it is 
noted above, the increase in government capital expenditure leads to a restriction of 
government consumption. The same impact on domestic debt occurs as a result of 
unchanged tax policy to respond to a higher increase in capital spending. As government 
borrowing increases, private sector access to financing shrinks and private investment 
growth reduces. As a way of comparison, this type of government spending has a similar 
effect on output and household consumption as does the government expenditure. 
Tax policy shocks: On the revenue side, a shock to consumption tax and capital income tax 
leads to a decrease in domestic debt growth. First, figure 5 shows the stabilizing effect of a 
shock to consumption tax on the domestic debt through an increase of government revenue; 
leading to a reduction of government borrowing. Conversely, households’ consumption 
responds negatively especially the consumption of Non-Ricardian households as those 
households do not have any saving in previous period to smooth their consumption. As a 
result, they react to the shock on consumption tax by supplying more labor to increase their 
after tax income; bringing the wage rate below the steady-state level. By the same token, a 
shock to capital income tax leads to a contraction of domestic debt growth (figure 6). A 
higher capital tax causes debt to fall below the steady-state as a result of less borrowing but 
causes a decrease in the return to capital. Firms respond to this decrease of return to capital 
by increasing demand for labor, leading to an increase of output growth above the steady-
state growth rate. As we can see, a shock on each of the two tax rates triggers a decrease in 
domestic debt with no adverse effect on output growth and household consumption. This 
effect seems preferable as it enables fiscal authorities to control domestic debt through an 
increase in tax rate and less borrowing.  
Counter to the previous findings, the results of labor income tax are somewhat 
counterintuitive. It appears that a shock to the labor income tax rate causes an increase in 
domestic debt growth while output and households’ consumption decline as a result of a 
higher nominal wage rate and lower demand for labor by firms (figure 7). This result is 
illustrative of Non-Ricardian behavior depicted by a decline in their consumption because 
                                                          
1
 The average duration of the price is computed as 
1
1 α−
 where α is the Calvo price stickiness parameter. 
2
 The magnitudes are presented as fiscal multipliers below. 
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they face lower demand for labor by firms. Since a higher fraction of households is Non-
Ricardian, the contraction of their consumption drives down the aggregate consumption 
which is the larger component of aggregate demand; thus a contraction in output growth. 
Conversely, Ricardian agents increase consumption by substitution of private capital leading 
to a contraction of private investment and capital stock with a negative impact on output. As 
consumption, private capital and labor demand growth decline, government revenue growth 
decline and the gap between government total expenditure and revenue increases. 
Consequently, the government resort to the issuance of a new bond to finance the budget 
deficit.  
Monetary policy effect on government debt: When monetary authorities increase the 
nominal interest rates to control inflation, we observe that domestic debt explodes as interest 
payment on new bond increases (figure 8). The fiscal authorities respond by tax adjustment 
in order to increase government revenue and less borrowing because government 
consumption and capital expenditure does not decrease following the shock to the nominal 
interest rate. Therefore, the debt returns to the equilibrium path. The increase of interest 
rates also leads to the contraction of private investment (crowding-out effect) and 
consequently the contraction of output growth. Although the tight monetary policy reduces 
inflation, the households’ consumption growth responds negatively as a result of the 
contraction of Ricardian households ‘consumption due to the substitution between bond and 
consumption. The contraction in private investment and household consumption leads to 
that of the output growth rate.  
Fiscal multiplier effect: 
In the previous section, we explain the driving forces of domestic debt and the impact of 
fiscal policy on output. To provide a quantitative measure of fiscal policy effect on output 
and debt dynamics over time, the analysis of the fiscal multipliers is carried out. We define 
cumulative multiplier as the expected cumulative change in output given one unit 
cumulative change in government spending as follows: 
0 0
T T
i
t t
t t
dY dG
= =
∑ ∑ . The impact 
multiplier is the first-period measure following the shock that is t
i
t
dY
dG
. The measures are 
computed from the equilibrium solution and the impulse response function for different time 
horizons: short, medium and long term (table 2). These results imply that one unit increase 
in any of government spending increases output by the corresponding multiplier (in unit). 
What emerges from the results is that government spending multiplier for consumption 
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expenditure is lower than that of capital expenditure at any time horizon; revealing the 
driving force of government investment in the economy. These findings are consistent with 
those of Shen et al (2015) who examined the fiscal multipliers under different sources of 
government budget deficit financing. Their findings reveal that under domestic debt 
financing, the fiscal multiplier for government consumption is 0.4 on impact and -0.4 in five 
years while fiscal multipliers for public investment is 0.3 on impact and -0.5 in five years 
period1. The small size of the fiscal multiplier (less than one) could be explained by the 
crowding-out effect of private investment created by fiscal expansion. 
Table 2: Government spending fiscal multipliers (on output) 
 Consumption 
expenditure 
Capital expenditure 
On impact 0.0036 0.0387 
Five years 0.1754 0.2264 
Cumulative 0.2479 0.3076 
Another relevant issue emerging from the finding is the analysis of fiscal multipliers of tax 
policy on debt path. As it was noted, both consumption tax and capital tax play the role of 
the stabilizer of domestic debt. As such, it is important to figure out the impact in the form 
of the multiplier effect. To perform this analysis, we proceed to the computation of the fiscal 
multipliers, replacing output by debt and government spending by tax variable in the 
computation above. The results are reported in table 3. As shown in the table, a significant 
difference in the impact effect is observed. Consumption tax shock provides a more 
stabilizing effect on the dynamics of domestic debt as the multiplier is larger at any time 
horizon than the capital income tax multiplier. Additional revenue generated by a shock of 
1% of the standard deviation of consumption tax rate reduces the domestic debt growth by 
0.35 percentage point on impact (in the first period) and the cumulative effect over five 
years period is 0.59.  
Table 3: Fiscal multipliers of the tax rate on domestic debt2 
 Consumption tax  Capital income tax 
On impact 
-0.3568 -0.0057 
Five years 
-0.5857 -0.0141 
Cumulative 
-0.2068 -0.0491 
                                                          
1
 Shen and al (2015) Developed a new-Keynesian small open economy model in the context of low-Income 
countries to show that some features (different types of financing including aid, the marginal efficiency of 
public investment, and the degree of home bias) play a key role in determining the effects of fiscal policy and 
related multipliers. 
2
 The multiplier of labor income tax is not reported as its effect is not negative and not important 
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Scenario analysis: To provide a clear picture of how these two tax rates shocks affect debt, 
we proceed to scenario analysis by changing the steady-state tax rate within the estimated 
interval (90% HPDI) reported in table 1. The impulse response of stock of domestic debt 
over five years periods reveals that the negative effect of consumption tax on debt is low on 
impact for any the steady-state tax rate in the interval and increases gradually over time 
(figure 9). The debt-to-GDP ratio, on the other hand, drops significantly on impact and this 
effect decays over time (from -10 to -4 over 5 years). The possible explanation of this result 
could be the rapid decay of the positive response of the output to shock on consumption tax.  
On the question of whether the steady-state capital income tax should be near zero, the 
scenario analysis provides an interesting result. The most obvious finding emerging from the 
analysis is that the negative response of debt following a shock to capital income tax decays 
as the steady-state tax increases (figure10). In the neighborhood of zero, the negative 
response is much stronger and remains steady over time but shifting the steady-state tax rate 
upward, the negative response becomes weaker and gets near zero at the horizon of five 
years. The debt ratio also follows the same pattern but with a stronger decay of the negative 
response. As the graph shows, on impact, the debt ratio responds strongly but the response 
decays and turns positive at the horizon of five years with the increase of the steady-state 
tax; suggesting that the convenient tax rate should remain within the estimated range. 
Failure of Ricardian equivalence: Not only does government spending affect private 
investment but it also affects households' demand depending on the way the deficit is 
financed. This financing sources cause the Ricardian equivalence to fail because of the 
existence of a larger fraction of Non-Ricardian agents in the economy. 
The Ricardian Equivalence states that it does not matter whether a government finances its 
spending with debt or a tax increase because the effect on the total level of household 
demand in the economy is the same. However, from the findings it emerges that household 
consumption rises weakly on impact; showing a humped shape impulse response following 
a shock to government consumption and investment. Meanwhile, there is a jump in the 
response of households’ consumption on impact for a very short period followed by a rapid 
return to the steady-state even below the steady-state level following a shock to consumption 
tax and capital income tax (figure 11). The response is unequivocally negative for the shock 
to labor income tax. These patterns are similar to that of Non-Ricardian consumption’s 
response to the same shocks (figure 12). By contrast, the IRF differs significantly for 
Ricardian households where consumption responds negatively to government consumption 
and investment shocks and positively following shocks to tax on consumption. The negative 
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response of Ricardian consumption to expansionary fiscal policy is explained by the rise of 
government debt to which Ricardian households respond by substitution of the bond to 
consumption (figure 13). These findings are consistent with the literature of the New 
Keynesian model incorporating Non-Ricardian households and exemplify the finding of 
Mankiw et al (2009) about the important role of this category of agents in the economy. 
VI. Concluding remarks 
The present study set out to investigate the effect of fiscal and monetary policies on 
domestic debt dynamics. The findings indicate that growing domestic debt results from 
innovations in government capital spending more than government consumption spending. 
The research has also shown that government borrowing crowds out private sector 
investment and thus making monetary policy less effective and lower interest rate provides 
more room for public borrowing rather than an increase of private sector investment. 
The second major finding was that consumption tax and capital income tax rates have a 
stabilizing effect on domestic debt whereas labor income tax produces a contraction of 
output growth and weakly positive impact on domestic debt due to a larger fraction of Non-
Ricardian households in the economy. Furthermore, the study has provided a quantitative 
framework for tax policy to alleviate fiscal stress without adverse impact on output growth. 
The estimated steady-state tax rates confirm the claim of Piketty (2015) that capital should 
be taxed and the results are a useful benchmark to tax policy.  
The research has provided additional evidence concerning the fiscal multiplier effect of 
government spending. It follows that government spending multiplier for consumption 
expenditure is lower than that of capital expenditure; revealing the driving force of 
government investment expenditure in the economy. This multiplier effect is also examined 
for the implementation of tax policy and the findings suggest that consumption tax shock 
provides a more stabilizing effect on the dynamics of domestic debt as the multiplier is 
larger than the capital income tax multiplier. Overall, the findings will be of interest to 
policymakers in conducting consistent fiscal and monetary policy for fiscal consolidation 
and output growth. 
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Appendix 1: Parameters’ definition and calibrated values 
Table 4: Calibrated parameters 
Parameters Values Description 
Households Preferences 
  
σ  1.5 Risk aversion parameter 
β  0.90 Discount factor 
γ  1.5 Labor disutility factor 
ω  0.20 Fraction of savers 
Firms production   
1θ  0.14 Private capital share in output  
2θ  0.107 Public capital share in output 
3θ  0.107 Labor share in output ρ  0.90 TFP autoregressive factor 
zσ  
0.0327 Stochastic component of TFP 
α  0.70 Calvo price stickiness parameter 
ψ  2.0 The elasticity of substitution between goods 
Gδ  0.035 The public capital depreciation rate 
Pδ  0.060 Private capital depreciation rate 
Monetary policy rule   
r
ρ  0.590 Feedback effect of nominal interest rate 
piφ  1.14 Inflation factor in Taylor rule 
yφ  0.125 Output gap factor in Taylor rule 
r
σ  0.2603 The stochastic component in Taylor rule 
Fiscal policy rule   
gcρ  0.973 Feedback effect of Government current expenditure 
gcϕ  0.300 Current expenditures reaction to the debt-to-GDP ratio  
gcσ  
0.1032 Stochastic component of GC 
giρ  0.913 Feedback effect of Government capital expenditure 
giϕ  0.300 Capital expenditures reaction to the debt-to-GDP ratio  
giσ  
0.3558 Stochastic component of GI 
cρ  0.945 Feedback effect of consumption tax  
cϕ  0.0415 Consumption tax reaction to output  
κ c  
0.0375 Consumption tax reaction to debt-to-GDP ratio 
tcσ  
0.1882 Stochastic component of consumption tax 
kρ  0.764 Feedback effect of capital tax  
kϕ  0.1403 Capital tax reaction to output  
κ k  
0.0643 Capital tax reaction to the debt-to-GDP ratio 
tkσ  
0.1434 Stochastic component of capital tax 
ρw  0.982 Feedback effect of labor tax  
ϕw  0.0967 Labor tax reaction to output  
κ w  
0.239 Labor tax reaction to the debt-to-GDP ratio 
twσ  
0.2425 Stochastic component of labor tax 
Steady-state parameters of Fiscal variables  
c
ssτ  
0.192 
 
Steady-state value of consumption tax rate 
k
ssτ  
0.043 
 
Steady-state value of capital income tax rate 
w
ssτ  
0.019 
 
Steady-state value of labor income tax rate 
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Appendix 2: Observed variables 
Figure 2: Filtered variables used for estimation 
 
Notes: The observed variables are real data used to estimate the deep parameters in the model. To match the 
theoretical variables to the true data, we demeaned the first difference in the log transformation of each 
variable. Since the model is log linearized about its steady state, the transformed variables have mean zero like 
the theoretical variables simulated by the model.  
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Appendix 3: Impulse response to shocks 
Figure 3: Shock to government consumption (ε gc ) 
 
Figure 4: Shock to government investment ( ε gi ) 
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Figure 5: Shock to consumption tax ( ctε ) 
 
Figure 6: Shock to capital income tax (ε kt ) 
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Figure 7: Shock to labor income tax ( wtε ) 
 
Figure 8: Shock to nominal interest rate (ε rt )  
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Figure 9: Impulse response over steady-state tax on consumption 
 
Figure 10: Impulse response over steady-state tax on capital income 
 
Figure 11: Impulse response of household consumption  
 
39 
 
Figure 12: Impulse response of Non-Ricardian households’ consumption  
 
Figure 13: Impulse response of Ricardian household consumption  
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Appendix 4: Some properties of the estimation 
Figure 14: Identification and sensitivity graphs 
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Figure 15: Mode check plots 
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Figure 16 : Prior and posterior distribution  plots 
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